271 lines
9.4 KiB
Python
271 lines
9.4 KiB
Python
# Eos - Verifiable elections
|
|
# Copyright © 2017 RunasSudo (Yingtong Li)
|
|
#
|
|
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
|
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
|
|
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
# (at your option) any later version.
|
|
#
|
|
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
|
|
#
|
|
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
|
|
# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
|
|
|
from eos.core.bigint import *
|
|
from eos.core.objects import *
|
|
from eos.core.hashing import *
|
|
from eos.base.election import *
|
|
|
|
class CyclicGroup(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
p = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
g = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
@property
|
|
def q(self):
|
|
# p = 2q + 1
|
|
return (self.p - ONE) / TWO
|
|
|
|
def random_Zp_element(self, crypto_random=True):
|
|
crypto_method = BigInt.crypto_random if crypto_random else BigInt.noncrypto_random
|
|
return crypto_method(ONE, self.p - ONE)
|
|
|
|
def random_Zps_element(self, crypto_random=True):
|
|
crypto_method = BigInt.crypto_random if crypto_random else BigInt.noncrypto_random
|
|
# Z_p* = {1..p-1} provided that p is a prime
|
|
return crypto_method(ONE, self.p - ONE)
|
|
|
|
def random_Zq_element(self, crypto_random=True):
|
|
crypto_method = BigInt.crypto_random if crypto_random else BigInt.noncrypto_random
|
|
return crypto_method(ZERO, self.q - ONE)
|
|
|
|
# RFC 3526, 2048-bit MODP Group
|
|
DEFAULT_GROUP = CyclicGroup(
|
|
p=BigInt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
|
|
g=TWO
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
class EGPublicKey(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
group = EmbeddedObjectField(CyclicGroup)
|
|
X = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
def nbits(self):
|
|
# Our messages are restricted to G_q
|
|
return self.group.q.nbits() - 1
|
|
|
|
# HAC 8.18
|
|
def _encrypt(self, message, randomness=None):
|
|
if message <= ZERO:
|
|
raise Exception('Invalid message')
|
|
if message >= self.group.p:
|
|
raise Exception('Invalid message')
|
|
|
|
if randomness is None:
|
|
# Choose an element 1 <= k <= p - 2
|
|
k = BigInt.crypto_random(ONE, self.group.p - TWO)
|
|
else:
|
|
k = randomness
|
|
|
|
gamma = pow(self.group.g, k, self.group.p)
|
|
delta = (message * pow(self.X, k, self.group.p)) % self.group.p
|
|
|
|
return EGCiphertext(public_key=self, gamma=gamma, delta=delta, m0=message, randomness=k)
|
|
|
|
# Adida 2008
|
|
def message_to_m0(self, message):
|
|
m0 = message + ONE
|
|
|
|
if pow(m0, self.group.q, self.group.p) == ONE:
|
|
# m0 is already in G_q
|
|
return m0
|
|
else:
|
|
# For the life of me I can't find any reputable references for this aside from Adida 2008...
|
|
m0 = (-m0) % self.group.p
|
|
return m0
|
|
|
|
def m0_to_message(self, m0):
|
|
if m0 < self.group.q:
|
|
return m0 - ONE
|
|
else:
|
|
return ((-m0) % self.group.p) - ONE
|
|
|
|
def encrypt(self, message, randomness=None):
|
|
if message < ZERO:
|
|
raise Exception('Invalid message')
|
|
if message >= self.group.q:
|
|
raise Exception('Invalid message')
|
|
|
|
return self._encrypt(self.message_to_m0(message), randomness)
|
|
|
|
class EGPrivateKey(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
pk_class = EGPublicKey
|
|
|
|
public_key = EmbeddedObjectField(EGPublicKey)
|
|
x = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
# HAC 8.17
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
def generate(cls, group=DEFAULT_GROUP):
|
|
# Choose an element 1 <= x <= p - 2
|
|
x = BigInt.crypto_random(ONE, group.p - TWO)
|
|
# Calculate the public key as G^x
|
|
X = pow(group.g, x, group.p)
|
|
|
|
pk = cls.pk_class(group=group, X=X)
|
|
sk = cls(public_key=pk, x=x)
|
|
return sk
|
|
|
|
# HAC 8.18
|
|
def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
|
|
if (
|
|
ciphertext.gamma <= ZERO or ciphertext.gamma >= self.public_key.group.p or
|
|
ciphertext.delta <= ZERO or ciphertext.delta >= self.public_key.group.p
|
|
):
|
|
raise Exception('Ciphertext is malformed')
|
|
|
|
gamma_inv = pow(ciphertext.gamma, self.public_key.group.p - ONE - self.x, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
|
|
pt = (gamma_inv * ciphertext.delta) % self.public_key.group.p
|
|
|
|
# Undo the encryption mapping
|
|
return self.public_key.m0_to_message(pt)
|
|
|
|
def decrypt_and_prove(self, ciphertext):
|
|
result = EGProvedPlaintext()
|
|
result.ciphertext = ciphertext
|
|
|
|
result.message = self.decrypt(ciphertext)
|
|
|
|
# Adida 2008
|
|
|
|
w = BigInt.crypto_random(ZERO, self.public_key.group.q - ONE) # random element in Z_q
|
|
result.commitmentA = pow(self.public_key.group.g, w, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
result.commitmentB = pow(ciphertext.gamma, w, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
|
|
result.challenge = SHA256().update_obj(ciphertext).update_obj(result.commitmentA).update_obj(result.commitmentB).hash_as_bigint()
|
|
|
|
result.response = w + self.x * result.challenge
|
|
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
class EGCiphertext(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
public_key = EmbeddedObjectField(EGPublicKey)
|
|
gamma = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt) # G^k
|
|
delta = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt) # M X^k
|
|
|
|
randomness = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt, is_hashed=False)
|
|
m0 = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt, is_hashed=False)
|
|
|
|
def reencrypt(self, k=None):
|
|
# Generate an encryption of one
|
|
if k is None:
|
|
k = BigInt.crypto_random(ONE, self.public_key.group.p - TWO)
|
|
gamma = pow(self.public_key.group.g, k, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
delta = pow(self.public_key.X, k, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
|
|
return EGCiphertext(public_key=self.public_key, gamma=((self.gamma * gamma) % self.public_key.group.p), delta=((self.delta * delta) % self.public_key.group.p)), k
|
|
|
|
def deaudit(self):
|
|
return EGCiphertext(public_key=self.public_key, gamma=self.gamma, delta=self.delta)
|
|
|
|
def is_randomness_valid(self):
|
|
ct = self.public_key._encrypt(self.m0, self.randomness)
|
|
return ct.gamma == self.gamma and ct.delta == self.delta
|
|
|
|
class EGProvedPlaintext(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
message = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
ciphertext = EmbeddedObjectField()
|
|
|
|
commitmentA = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
commitmentB = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
challenge = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
response = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
def is_proof_valid(self):
|
|
gt = pow(self.ciphertext.public_key.group.g, self.response, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p)
|
|
Ayc = (self.commitmentA * pow(self.ciphertext.public_key.X, self.challenge, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p)) % self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p
|
|
if gt != Ayc:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
at = pow(self.ciphertext.gamma, self.response, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p)
|
|
m0 = self.ciphertext.public_key.message_to_m0(self.message)
|
|
m_inv = pow(m0, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p - TWO, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p)
|
|
Bbmc = (self.commitmentB * pow(self.ciphertext.delta * m_inv, self.challenge, self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p)) % self.ciphertext.public_key.group.p
|
|
if at != Bbmc:
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
return True
|
|
|
|
# Signed ElGamal per Schnorr & Jakobssen
|
|
class SEGPublicKey(EGPublicKey):
|
|
def _encrypt(self, message, randomness=None):
|
|
if randomness is None:
|
|
# Choose an element 1 <= k <= p - 2
|
|
r = BigInt.crypto_random(ONE, self.group.p - TWO)
|
|
else:
|
|
r = randomness
|
|
s = BigInt.crypto_random(ONE, self.group.p - TWO)
|
|
|
|
gamma = pow(self.group.g, r, self.group.p) # h
|
|
delta = (message * pow(self.X, r, self.group.p)) % self.group.p # f
|
|
|
|
c = SHA256().update_bigint(pow(self.group.g, s, self.group.p), gamma, delta).hash_as_bigint()
|
|
|
|
z = s + c*r
|
|
|
|
return SEGCiphertext(public_key=self, gamma=gamma, delta=delta, c=c, z=z, m0=message, randomness=r)
|
|
|
|
class SEGPrivateKey(EGPrivateKey):
|
|
pk_class = SEGPublicKey
|
|
|
|
class SEGCiphertext(EGCiphertext):
|
|
public_key = EmbeddedObjectField(SEGPublicKey)
|
|
c = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
z = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
def is_signature_valid(self):
|
|
gs = (pow(self.public_key.group.g, self.z, self.public_key.group.p) * pow(self.gamma, self.public_key.group.p - ONE - self.c, self.public_key.group.p)) % self.public_key.group.p
|
|
c = SHA256().update_bigint(gs, self.gamma, self.delta).hash_as_bigint()
|
|
|
|
return self.c == c
|
|
|
|
def deaudit(self):
|
|
return SEGCiphertext(public_key=self.public_key, gamma=self.gamma, delta=self.delta, c=self.c, z=self.z)
|
|
|
|
class Polynomial(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
coefficients = EmbeddedObjectListField(BigInt) # x^0, x^1, ... x^n
|
|
modulus = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt)
|
|
|
|
def value(self, x):
|
|
if not isinstance(x, BigInt):
|
|
x = BigInt(x)
|
|
|
|
result = ZERO
|
|
for i in range(len(self.coefficients)):
|
|
#result = (result + ((self.coefficients[i] * pow(x, i, self.modulus)) % self.modulus)) % self.modulus
|
|
result = result + (self.coefficients[i] * pow(x, i))
|
|
return result
|
|
|
|
class PedersenVSSPrivateKey(EmbeddedObject):
|
|
public_key = EmbeddedObjectField(SEGPublicKey)
|
|
|
|
x = EmbeddedObjectField(BigInt) # secret
|
|
|
|
def get_modified_secret(self):
|
|
mod_s = self.x
|
|
for j in range(1, threshold + 1): # 1 to threshold
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
def decrypt(self, ciphertext):
|
|
if (
|
|
ciphertext.gamma <= ZERO or ciphertext.gamma >= self.public_key.group.p or
|
|
ciphertext.delta <= ZERO or ciphertext.delta >= self.public_key.group.p
|
|
):
|
|
raise Exception('Ciphertext is malformed')
|
|
|
|
gamma_inv = pow(ciphertext.gamma, self.public_key.group.p - ONE - self.x, self.public_key.group.p)
|
|
return gamma_inv
|